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STUDENTS, HIGHER EDUCATION,

AND THE LAW
By WILLIAM M. BEANEY*
"Law never is, but is always about to be."
-Cardozo'
'[Clertainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of
man. . . .We do not realize how large a part of our la.w is open
to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the public
mind."
2
-Holmes

AMERICAN colleges and universities are clearly not exempt from
-

the currents of thought and action now generally affecting our

political and social institutions. Traditional values

and customary

relationships are being reexamined and frequently attacked, and
private and public organizations are being compelled to take a fresh
look at existing practices and accepted purposes. The one certainty

is that significant changes in the internal and external relations of
institutions of higher learning will continue to take place.3 The tasks
confronting those who share responsibility for the viability and improvement of higher education are to winnow constructive proposals

from potentially harmful ones, to provide realistic definitions of
the roles and functions of all participants in the life of universities,
and to create an internal ordering and spirit which furthers the
achievement of agreed goals.
The specific purpose of this article is to describe some of the
ways in which present and emerging legal principles and procedures
may affect the internal ordering of colleges and universities, focusing
on those elements relevant to the range of problems presented by the
claims of undergraduate and graduate students to a larger and, in
some respects, different role in the academic and social life of these

institutions. Student claims thus far advanced have at least these main
objectives: to gain a greater share in the making of decisions involving goals, programs, and academic style; to win a much larger,
perhaps even dominant, share in decisions involving policies, rules,
and regulations governing students' lives and social activities both
of Politics, Princeton University; A.B., Harvard University, 1940; LL.B.
19,47, Ph.D. 1951, University of Michigan. Visiting Professor of Law, University of
Denver College of Law, 1968-69.
'B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 126 (1921).
2Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 466 (1897).
3The larger implications of student involvement in political affairs are examined in
*Professor

STUDENT POLITICS (S. Lipset ed. 1967).
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on and off campuses; to achieve virtually unlimited freedom to express ideas and advocate or oppose various causes; and finally,
to secure improved disciplinary procedures in which students play a
larger role.4
The following brief survey of leading concepts and principles
of law relevant to the resolution of these claims should not be misconstrued. While courts have spoken with respect to some of the
problems arising from student-institutional relationships, they have
in the past shown great deference to university decisions. At least
one claim, perhaps the most critical of the pressing issues, seems illsuited for judicial resolution. That claim is to a greater share in
university decisionmaking and will, of course, engage the attention
of faculties, state legislatures, and trustees of private institutions, but
it is unlikely to be resolved by the courts. Yet, it is clear that to the
extent that courts evolve and apply doctrines which improve the
status of students and provide greater recognition and protection
for their rights, their claim to participate in decisionmaking is enhanced. 5 It is also clear that most institutions, frequently in response
to student requests, will redefine students' rights and responsibilities
without regard for the existing or emerging requirements of the
formal legal system. Most will seek to improve relations between
students, faculty, and administration in order to better achieve their
educational objectives, without pedantic attention to the relatively
few limitations on their wide discretion in determining control of
university affairs imposed by the formal legal order. This and other
conference papers examine some of the critical issues that may be
presented to the courts and legislatures, particularly if the universities
fail to evolve satisfactory solutions of their own. To the extent that
reasonable solutions are provided by the universities, however, the
occasions for successful judicial intervention will diminish.
The possible value of law, in helping to shape solutions and in
providing useful lessons drawn from experiences in parallel social
situations, arises from its agelong concern with the defining of relationships in a wide variety of individual and associative contexts,
its adaption to changes through the redefining of relationships, its
handling of troublesome cases, and its concern for both the maintenance and proper exercise of legitimate authority. It must be recognized, however, that law in itself contains no panaceas; it offers
4Obviously, more extreme claims have been, and are being, advanced by student
spokesmen. However, the listed claims seem to me to be the principal ones that
receive support from the most substantial number of students.

5 Participation in decisionmaking is clearly the students' main objective, but the elevation in status as a member of the university community implicit in that goal is furthered by judicial or administration actions recognizing free speech, privacy, and other
student claims.
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more or less effective solutions to human problems, depending on
the skill and judgment of those who shape it.' Neither legislatures
nor courts are competent to run universities. Yet, if our educational
institutions become distressed and pressures for solutions become
severe, legislatures may intervene. Although unskilled in university
administration, even courts, which are specialists in determining
justice between men, may in proper cases act to ensure that justice
between students and institutions is done. The correct conclusion
to be drawn is that the universities should establish an internal order
that takes into account the legitimate claims of students. That order
should embody a spirit of justice and fairness, resulting from a
recognition that rights and obligations of students should be defined
after long and thoughtful consultations and deliberation. It would be
a disastrous mistake if student claims were to be casually dismissed
simply because the law at present provides no compulsion to act
differently, and because the student has been traditionally regarded
as the innocent ward of a beneficent, all-wise, and all-powerful
parent.
I. In Loco Parentis AND

RELATED DOCTRINES

Institutions of higher learning owe their existence and their
powers to the decision by politically organized society that they fulfill
one or more vital social functions. Public institutions are creations
of state legislatures; those regarded as private institutions are also
recipients of grants from the legislature in the form of charters. For
understandable reasons, these delegations of power by legislatures are
general; they set forth the educational objectives, establish a governing board, and state the principal powers that the institution may
exercise. For the most part, these grants or charters show little or no
concern with the relations between students and their mentors.
Whatever the traditions of medieval European universities or the
traditions and practices in other parts of the world, American institutions have assumed that their power - administered through governing boards and officers acting under their authority - to control
the academic program is unlimited, and that there are few if any
limits on their power to control the noncurricular activities of students. The relatively small body of caselaw involving student
6 Some

scholars consider law a value-neutral technique of social control. See W.
LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA (1966). The positivists regard
morals and law as wholly separate, while the sociological school is concerned largely
with the social interests advanced or protected by law. Others feel that law and
moral considerations are necessarily intertwined. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW (1964). All would agree, however, that the quality of law and its effectiveness
depends on intelligent decisions as to what law can and cannot accomplish, careful
attention in formulating its substance, and appropriate choice of procedures for
carrying it into effect.
HARVEY,
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challenges to expulsions or to refusals to grant degrees represents a
very small number of isolated attacks on the system by offended
individuals. The prevailing social attitudes in the United States seem
clearly to have reinforced the conceptions of the university-student
relationships held by most institutions - one in which the student
has few privileges, even fewer rights, and substantial obligations.
The university, by contrast, is seen as a benevolent, dominating
master, free to dictate the terms and conditions governing the lives
of students during their period of residence.
Courts have used various legal formulae in justifying an essentially "hands-off" policy toward institutions of higher learning,
both public and private. The basic attitude has been a compound of
deference to the expertise of the educator, fear that judicial interference in behalf of students might pose dangers to the well-being
of institutions, and perhaps a subconscious feeling of aversion
towards students and parents who failed to conform.
The doctrine of in loco parentis developed from the judicial
reaction in the 19th century to criminal and civil actions by parents
against private tutors and teachers who were responsible for the
imposition of physical punishment on their students. 7 Just as the
parent could punish his children, said the courts, so also could the
surrogate parent - the tutor or schoolmaster. Much later, the Restatement of Torts (1934) referred to the in loco parentispower of private
schools as being delegated by the parents, but quite unrealistically
described it as limited by the specific terms in each parent's delegation of this power.8 In public schools and colleges, the in loco parentis
power was described by courts as analogous to that of parents, but
with a foundation in law independent of specific parental instructions. While Gott v. Berea College1" is frequently cited as the
authority for in loco parentis, cases of earlier vintage can be found,
and the doctrine and variants have served courts into the present era.
Supplemented by a 1934 decision of the United States Supreme Court,
holding that attendance at public universities was a privilege and not
a right," the judicial attitude has clearly been opposed to intensive
review of institutional decisions.
7 See references in Note, Private Government on the Campus -

Judicial Review of
University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1368 (1963). This is a valuable, wellreasoned article whose scope is much broader than the title suggests. The most recent
effort at a comprehensive legal analysis is a section Academic Freedom of Students in
Developments in the Law -Academic
Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1128-59
(1968).
8 Note, Private Government on the Campus- Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1368 & n.24 (1963).
9Id.

10 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
11Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
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Many courts have chosen not to rely on in loco parentis,
recognizing that this legal relic of an earlier and simpler era provides an inadequate foundation for describing the rights and duties
of participants in increasingly complex university affairs. Admittedly,
no single legal concept can provide answers to a myriad of specific
issues, but the effort to formulate a general principle underlying
student-institutional relations may have great significance in shaping
the attitudes of institutional officers or students and, more importantly, will tend to influence the style and process of actual
governance. Some courts have relied upon the existence of a contract,
express or implied, between a student and the institution. This contract incorporates the rules and other provisions in the catalogs and
various other school documents, including the catchall right proclaimed in some regulations "to expel a student for any reason
deemed sufficient," which reason need not be revealed. 2 Other
courts have attributed a large and virtually unrestrained institutional
power over students either to custom or to legislative or charter
provisions, or simply to the functional needs of the institution.'
Whatever the legal formula relied on by the courts, the result has
been, with a few recent exceptions, to uphold institutional authority
and to regard the power to discipline the student, including the
drastic act of expulsion, as largely beyond judicial control.
Several related developments have contributed to, and will continue to shape, a changing, more receptive attitude of the courts
toward those challenging institutional treatment of students. One is
the pervasive thrust in our society to achieve equal rights for all
disadvantaged groups. Increasingly, the courts have been forced to
examine the realities of a variety of real-life social situations. A
second development is a wider acceptance of the right of dissenters
and advocates of various causes to a fuller freedom of expression
under the first amendment. A third is a tendency to examine more
critically the behavior of powerful private associations whose actions
may adversely affect their own members and the wider society.' 4
The public-private distinction, while it remains one of great significance in law, is less readily resorted to as a shorthand answer to
those who accuse private associations of wrongdoing. Finally, there
is an upsurge in the demand for wider sharing and participation in
Note, supra note 8, at 1377-79.
Id. at 1368-69.
14 See Developments in the Law- Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations,
76 HFAv. L. REV. 983 (1963), which should be compared in its findings with the
earlier seminal analysis by Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for
Profit, 43 HARV. L REV. 993 (1930). The growth of judicial intervention has been
substantial.
12
13
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the processes of decisionmaking, and a readiness to challenge existing
allocations of power.
Two recent cases may be cited to illustrate the changing attitudes of courts. Both involve public institutions, but their lessons are
no less significant for private universities. Dixon v. Alabama,' a
federal court case, involved the dismissal from a state college of
several Negro students who had participated in racial protest demonstrations. The specific ground for holding the expulsions unlawful
was a denial of due process of law resulting from the failure to give
the students notice of the charges and a hearing. In reversing the
lower court, the court of appeals judge commented that it was not
enough to say, as had the district court, that "It~he right to attend
a public college or university is not in and of itself a constitutional
right."' 6 In a recent state case, Goldberg v. Regents of the University
of California,7 the court upheld the dismissal from a state university
of students charged with the deliberate public use of foul language.
The court severely attacked the in loco parentis doctrine and the
notion that attendance at a public institution was a privilege, not a
right. "Rather," said the court, "attendance at publicly financed
institutions of higher education should be regarded [as] a benefit
'1 8
somewhat analogous to that of public employment.
In Goldberg, the university's disciplinary action was viewed as
"a proper exercise of its inherent general powers to maintain order
on the campus and to exclude therefrom those who are detrimental
to its well being ...,19 The court held it reasonable for the institution to enforce a rule essential to order and propriety as a necessary
condition for carrying out the functions of the university. While
neither of these decisions reflects an eagerness by the judiciary to
undertake a sustained scrutiny of the internal order of universities,
they do suggest that institutions should examine their rules and regulations to determine if they are relevant to the achievement of legitimate educational purposes. They also imply a willingness on the
part of the courts to intervene when an institution acts arbitrarily.
While prophecy in law as in other matters is risky, one can
anticipate a gradual reformulation in law of the relationship of the
university to its students. A recent suggestion is that the institution
15 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
16 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945, 950 (M.D. Ala. 1960).
17248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
1857 Cal. Rptr. at 470. "[T~he better approach," said the court, is "that state universities
should no longer stand in loco parentis in relation to their students." (Footnote
omitted). Id. At one time the courts, regarding public employment as a privilege,
permitted dismissals for any cause. This is no longer permitted. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.13 (Supp. 1965).
19 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 473 (1967).
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should be regarded as a fiduciary in its relation with students."0
Another suggestion is that a differently ordered set of principles
arising from implied contract principles might be set forth by the
courts with greater emphasis on the rights of students. 2 Whatever
the form of legal resolution, it is probably true that the realities of
student-institutional relations worked out within the academic community will greatly influence the attitude of the judges. While it is
impossible to eliminate the odd or unforeseen case, reasonable rules
affecting students that appear appropriate and necessary for achieving the purposes of the institution, particularly those devised with
some form of student consultation and participation which are applied
through fair procedures, are unlikely to appear arbitrary to the
courts.
II.

THE STANDARDS OF EQUALITY AND FAIRNESS

In many of the specific controversies arising from the imposition of disciplinary penalties, it may be claimed that the individual
was denied due process of law or the equal protection of the laws.
In both the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution, due process guaranties appear, the former a limitation
on actions of the national government, the latter directed at the
states. Originating in English law as an historic admonition that
citizens were to be dealt with according to "the law of the land" or
"due process of law," these clauses have had a wondrous history
in American law. They were used at times by the courts to invalidate
social legislation, but in recent decades they serve as an important
limitation on all governmental procedures by which any person may
suffer a loss or serious disadvantage.2 In addition, the due process
clause in the fourteenth amendment has been interpreted over the
years by the United States Supreme Court to impose virtually all of
the rights and guaranties of the Bill of Rights as limitations on the
states. With the abandonment of the principle that attendance at an
institution of higher learning is a privilege and not a right, it now
20 Goldman, The University and the Liberty of its Students-

A Fiduciary Theory, 54
Ky. L.J. 643 (1966). "All the elements of a fiduciary relation are present in the
student-university relationship," he concludes. "It is no small trust- no small display
of confidence to place oneself under the educational mentorship of a particular
university." Id. at 671. While a fiduciary theory would protect against arbitrary
acts of suspension or expulsion, it hardly fits student demands for sharing in university decisions. The latter type of issue, however, is unlikely to get into courts, and
will have to be resolved at each institution in the way that most political issues are
settled - by discussion and negotiation.
21Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1145-47
(1968).
2 For a general survey of the growth of due process see E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST

GOVERNMENT (1948). The march of due process and equal protection doctrines in
the United States Supreme Court is recorded in the volumes of the Annual Survey
of American Law and the annual November issues of the Harvard Law Review. The
volume of relevant literature is overwhelming.
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serves as a barrier against arbitrary institutional actions which impose
penalties on students.
The equal protection clause is found only in the fourteenth
amendment and is ostensibly a limitation on state acts that discriminate or use classifications that have no rational basis. The most
dramatic employment of the clause is seen in the series of cases
outlawing discrimination in schools, libraries, and other public facilities. We should note the special emphasis on the central importance of education in our society in the leading case, Brown v. Board
of Education,3 as a clue to the potential application of the equal
protection clause to higher education.
Although both guaranties appear to be directed solely at governmental action, some recent decisions reveal a judicial willingness to
regard certain forms of private activities as sufficiently affected by,
or related to, public action to be treated as governmental action in
law. 24 It is by no means clear that private colleges and universities
will be included by the courts in its quasi-public category. Except
for those private institutions with an announced religious or other
special orientation, however, inclusion of private educational institutions that receive various public benefits and have a number of
ties with state authority would be consistent with visible tendencies
25
in the law.
A second source of potential expansion exists in the very recent
agreement of a majority of the Supreme Court to give meaning to
the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment, which empowers Congress to implement the positive provisions of the amendment.2" Thus Congress, under pressure from constituents, might
progressively enlarge the meaning of both due process and equal
protection through legislation outlawing educational practices viewed
as discriminatory or unfair. Again, it would appear that there is a
sufficient nexus between "private" institutions and public relationships (benefits, support, etc.) to justify their inclusion in such
legislation.
Whether or not the courts choose to treat private institutions as
public, it is conceivable that due process and equal protection conceptions may be read into the contractual or status relationships of
student and university. Even if the courts treat private institutions
23 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Note that the Court relied on the fifth amendment due process

clause in forbidding segregation in the District of Columbia schools. Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
24 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), is the latest of the leading cases holding that
'private" action may under certain circumstances be viewed as state action, thus
making the equal protection clause (and the due process clause) applicable.
25 See Developments in the Law- Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. R-Ev. 1045, 1056-64
(1968), for an analysis of this possibility.
26 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
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as largely exempt from the application of these guaranties, it is
hardly realistic to assume that private institutions would be willing to
provide rules and procedures that meet substantially lower standards
of equality and fairness in dealing with students than those required
of public institutions. For all these reasons, it seems desirable to
make no distinction between private and public institutions, with
the notable exception of any school relying on its announced religious orientation to justify a special admission policy and rules
and regulations that reflect its sectarian concerns.
What are the possible applications of due process and equal
protection to the relations of students and universities? Clearly, equal
protection could be applied to prevent any demonstrable discrimination in admissions or declinations that lacked a rational basis. Racially
motivated policies are clearly outlawed, and any form of discrimination based on nonrational characteristics are suspect.
Rules pertaining to academic and noncurricular matters must
be reasonably related to institutional objectives. They must to the
fullest possible extent provide meaningful standards to guide students in their academic and other activities and should be enforced
through clearly stated and fairly administered procedures. Admittedly, this is a readily declared principle, but serious problems arise in
its real-life application. While this is not the place to deal with the
range of specific issues which are the concern of other conference
papers, the relevance of due process and equal protection conceptions to the formulation and application of academic and other rules
should be made as clear as possible. Courts are unlikely to welcome
challenges to the content or enforcement of rules directly concerned
with academic matters for the obvious reason that universities are
far more qualified than courts to determine appropriate academic
standards and to apply them to students. In addition, the courts
would certainly recognize the in terrorem effect of the mere possibility of lawsuits on the teaching process, as well as the terrible
burden a plethora of cases brought by disgruntled students would
place on the courts. When one moves from issues arising solely from
judgments regarding the quality of student academic performance
to those involving judgments and penalties for failure to comply
with academic requirements which have a factually determinable
basis, the potentiality of eventual court review is somewhat stronger.
Lack of clearly defined consequences for lateness of submitting work
and failure to clarify rules concerning the attribution of sources
on student papers might cause difficulties. Lack of consistency in
rulings of expulsion for failure to make normal academic progress
might also provide opportunities for judicial review. It is the excessive
vagueness or ambiguity of the rules concerning academic require-
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ments, or the obvious inconsistency in their application, that may
give rise to lawsuits. Greater attention to these problems by faculty
and administrators should largely eliminate any danger of judicial
interference.
The more difficult questions arise from institutional rules and
regulations governing noncurricular activities, both on and off the
campus. An especially vulnerable type of rule is the overly general
catchall, such as "failure to behave as a gentleman," or "as an X
Institution student is expected to behave," or "as a responsible member of the university community," or the ultimate in arbitrary rulemaking, permitting severance for any reason, which need not be
revealed. Clearly, rules to be valid must bear a reasonable relation
to the educational purposes of the institution.2 7 Interferences with
a student's right to enjoy first amendment and other constitutional
guaranties can, of course, be challenged by direct invocation of the
relevant constitutional provision. Punishment for participation in
lawful though unpopular activities, or for expression of unorthodox
ideas, clearly denies constitutional rights. An educational institution
obviously must create and maintain conditions conducive to the
achievement of its educational goals, but query whether many institutions may have assumed an excessively large responsibility for
the ordering of the personal lives of students in the light of drastically
changed social attitudes and values.
The significance of due process and equal protection is made
most clear with respect to the procedures used in imposing sanctions
on students for violation of rules and regulations.2 " On this subject,
judges may well conclude that they, not the educators, are the experts. Due process and equal protection require adequate notice and
a fair hearing. Courts recognize, however, that just as a formal administrative hearing of a governmental agency does not call for all
the specific safeguards of the criminal trial, notice and hearing in
student disciplinary matters may not necessarily require all of the
features of a formal administrative hearing. At the least, the student must be informed of the charge against him in sufficient time
to prepare adequately for the hearing. He should have an opportunity to present witnesses on his behalf and to question witnesses
against him. It has been recommended that a student should have
the assistance of at least an advisor, if not counsel. 9 There should
27

That seems to be one of the commands derived from the Goldberg case. Admittedly
it is a very general standard, but it can be used to nullify unnecessary rules.
28 For a good, brief survey including the latest decisions see Developments in the Law
-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1134-43 (1968).
29
joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, 53 A.A.U.P. BULL. 365 (1967).
One may well speculate on whether the use of 'advisors" will meet due process
requirements.
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be a summary record and an opportunity for appeal. Obviously, the
spirit with which these procedures are used are of vital importance;
a mere formal observance is insufficient. An institution, large or
small, which insists on using highly truncated and informal methods
in dealing with serious disciplinary problems is inviting judicial
intervention. The obvious thrust of legal developments in recent
decades has been toward increased judicial scrutiny of procedures
used in reaching decisions that adversely affect vital interests of
individuals and groups. Government and its instrumentalities, and,
in ever greater degree, private associations as well, are compelled
to observe the rules of reasonableness and fairness in the procedures
they employ.
A very recent decision of the United States Supreme Court
expresses vividly the changed attitude of courts toward the importance
of procedural guarantees. In the case of In re Gault,30 the Court
declared unconstitutional several procedures (or lack thereof) characteristic of juvenile proceedings in all our states. In effect, the Court
is unwilling to see young offenders deprived of safeguards regarded
as essential in adult criminal proceedings. The justification for informal procedures and lack of procedural safeguards - that the
interests of juveniles would be adequately protected by the juvenile
court judge and other officials, and that the purpose of helping, not
punishing, offenders would be advanced thereby-proved illusory
31
in practice.
III.

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

In 1890, two Boston attorneys, Louis S. Brandeis and his partner
Samuel Warren, argued in a law review article that a private legal
remedy should be available to those injured by newspapers and others
who intrude into the personal lives of Americans. 32 As a Supreme
Court Associate Justice, Brandeis urged in vain that the fourth
amendment guarantee should be extended to new forms of invasion
of the home - wiretapping in this case - because the framers of
the Constitution had sought through the amendment "to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations." 33 To accomplish this protection, the framers had conferred "the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men."3 4 Although this seemed
30 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
31

The justification frequently offered for highly informal, irregular institutional disciplinary procedures is the desire to help, not punish, students, and therefore any
semblance of an adversary proceeding should be avoided.

32 Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
33 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).

34 Id.
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mere rhetoric at the time, the law has hesitatingly, but inevitably,
moved in the direction Brandeis proposed. Privacy is recognized in
many states as a private right protected by suit, and the fourth
amendment provides increasing protection against intrusive actions
by both state and federal governments. The right to privacy was held
to be guaranteed by the Constitution in a 1965 Supreme Court decision
invalidating a Connecticut anticontraceptive law. 5 Essentially, it is a
broad and expanding protection to the dignity and personality of
individuals and groups against various forms of unreasonable intrusive behavior.8 6
The relevance of this legal right to student-institutional relations
should be obvious. As a citizen, a student enjoys the constitutional
right to privacy. As a student, he may be asked to give essential
information relevant to his educational program, but he should not
be subjected to intrusive queries about personal affairs, nor should he
be used as a subject in surveys or experiments without his informed
consent. While residing in university dormitory facilities, a student
may be required to submit to periodic fire and health inspections of
his quarters, and to have them entered to prevent harm to persons or
property, or when necessary to maintain order, but students should
be able to enjoy security from casual and prying entries. Similarly,
the right to privacy requires each institution to maintain the confidentiality of student records from unjustified queries. There may
be administrative difficulties to overcome in making information
available to a student's prospective employer and others with a
legitimate interest in his qualifications while denying them to those
with no such interest, but the task is hardly insuperable, and the
gain both to student privacy and to mutual confidence in studentinstutional relationships is substantial.
IV.

FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS

The first amendment guaranties of freedom of speech, religion,
press, assembly, and that prohibiting an establishment of religion
have assumed ever greater significance in the past 30 years. When
the United States Supreme Court in 1937 abandoned its previous
role as a censor of social and economic legislation and implementing administrative action, it assumed a new set of functions by
protecting dissenting individuals and groups expressing unpopular
causes against repressive official action.' Many of the most important
35 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36 See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967), for a full account of the development of this right.
37 See H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT (1967),

judicial decisions.

for a survey of post 1937
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recent cases have involved demonstrations, sit-ins, and other forms
of protest by those seeking desegregated public and private facilities
of various kinds. Both state and national governmental actions are
limited by first amendment guaranties. In the light of the discussion
above, it is unlikely that private institutions would be permitted to
deny or improperly limit the first amendment rights of students,
except to the extent that colleges and universities with a sectarian
religious orientation may impose special requirements with respect to
religious matters.
The courts have stated on many occasions that the first amendment rights are not unlimited. Government representatives may set
reasonable conditions for the time, place, and manner of exercising
these rights, and a university is similarly justified in setting reasonable
regulations to protect academic objectives and to maintain order on
campus."' Nevertheless, students would seem to have a right to form
associations on campus for any lawful purpose. 9 Since students enjoy
all the constitutional rights of other citizens, it is difficult to see how
a university can restrict off-campus student activities involving the
lawful exercise of apparent first amendment rights. The unpopularity
or irrationality of student expression provides no justification for
suppression or penalty. On the other hand, active participation in
causes will not justify a student's failure to discharge his academic
objectives.
It would be extremely unfortunate if institutions of higher learning, having successfully fought so many battles with legislatures and
trustees in the name of academic freedom for the faculty, should fail
to recognize that freedom for students to express ideas without fear
of penalty is also essential to a free academic community. Obviously,
students may not always exhibit a full sense of responsibility in their
zeal to express ideas, but that is hardly a sufficient reason to stifle
their expression.
CONCLUSION

The changing and often painful relations between students and
institutions of higher learning suggest that some lessons may be
drawn from the experience of the legal system in dealing with
problems that arise in defining other social relationships. It is also
suggested that, although the courts are moving cautiously in rede38

The rules must provide reasonably clear guidance and must not be applied in such a
way that innocent speech is inhibited. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
S This should be qualified by adding that formal university "sanction" or 'approval"
might be withheld from some dangerous or undesirable associations that had a lawful
purpose. Nevertheless, the right to associate seems to have a firm constitutional basis.
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960), the Supreme Court protected against the compelled disclosure of the membership list of an unpopular association.
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fining the status of students, reliance on the doctrine of in loco
parentis is no longer tenable. Similarly, courts in the future will be
less willing to use express or implied contract principles to justify
virtually unlimited control over students, including the ultimate
sanction- expulsion. It is suggested that both public and private
institutions should take into account this changing attitude of courts,
although in practice many have already recognized a substantially
changed status of students and have adopted policies and procedures
constituting a new internal ordering of university life.
Rules spelling out student academic and noncurricular obligations should be as precise and informative as possible. Due process
of law and equal protection of law standards, which indicate the
desirability of this precision, also require reasonable consistency in the
interpretation and application of rules. Given the heightened concern
of courts for procedural rights and regularity, it is imperative that
institutions adopt procedures calculated to give adequate notice and
afford a fair hearing in all disciplinary cases, for, apart from the
intrinsic worth of proper procedural safeguards, omissions or illconceived steps are likely to invite judicial scrutiny. It has been noted
that the use of procedures in juvenile proceedings that failed to meet
the Constitutional standards required for adults charged with criminal
offences has met with disapproval by the courts.
The emergence of a right to privacy, a legal concept of great
potentiality, suggests the wisdom of a reexamination of administrative
practices that may offend the dignity and invade the privacy of
students. Finally, the expansion of first amendment rights by the
courts in the past 30 years, and the attention which the courts are
willing to give to claims of minorities and dissident individuals,
should warn colleges and universities to avoid policies and practices
that overtly or indirectly curtail students' exercise of first amendment
rights of speech, press, and assembly.

